The Explanatory Value of Abstracting Away from Idiosyncratic and Messy Detail by Clarke, Christopher
The Explanatory Virtue of Abstracting Away
from Idiosyncratic and Messy Detail
Christopher Clarke
Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies
Abstract
Some explanations are relatively abstract: they abstract away from the id-
iosyncratic or messy details of the case in hand. The received wisdom in
philosophy is that this is a virtue for any explanation to possess. I argue that
the apparent consensus on this point is illusory. When philosophers make
this claim, they diﬀer on which of four alternative varieties of abstractness
they have in mind. What’s more, for each variety of abstractness there are
several alternative reasons to think that the variety of abstractness in question
is a virtue. I identify the most promising reasons, and dismiss some others.
The paper concludes by relating this discussion to the idea that explanations
in biology, psychology and social science cannot be replaced by relatively
micro explanations without loss of understanding.
1 Abstract Patterns and Understanding
Explanations in the social sciences often employ some concepts that are rela-
tively ‘macro’ compared to the concepts that psychology, for instance, employs.
Very roughly speaking, these concepts count as relatively macro because there is
a sense in which they are about relatively macroscopic wholes—such as nation
states—rather than about their relatively microscopic parts such as individual hu-
mans (Clarke Manuscript–a). In turn, explanations in psychology often employ
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some concepts that are macro relative to those that the physiological sciences em-
ploy. And, in turn, explanations in the physiological sciences often employ some
concepts that are macro relative to those that the physical sciences employ.
Some of these explanations in physiology, psychology and social science can-
not be replaced by any relatively micro explanation without loss of understanding.
Or so it seems. The received wisdom in philosophy is that this is because micro ex-
planations include relatively idiosyncratic or ‘messy’ details of the particular case
in hand. In contrast, most macro explanations ‘abstract away’ from some of these
details. And to abstract away from some of the details of a case, in the right way,
is to highlight a ‘pattern’ at the macro level.1 This is a virtue: explanations that
highlight a pattern provide understanding of the case in hand that isn’t provided
by explanations that fail to highlight that same pattern. Therefore some macro
explanations cannot be replaced by any relatively micro explanation without loss
of understanding. (Some would go further, and add that the details included in
the micro explanations above are irrelevant, and so such explanations provide no
understanding over and above the understanding provided by these macro ex-
planations.2 They don’t even complement the understanding provided by these
macro explanations.)
This argument from abstractness has played a central role in key debates in
the philosophy of biology, mind and social science.3 But, as it stands, the argu-
ment cries out for clariﬁcation. Firstly, what exactly is it for an explanation to
abstract away from the details of another? Or equally, what is it to highlight a
pattern? Some authors leave these notions entirely vague (Kitcher 1984; Kincaid
1986; Pereboom and Kornblith 1991; Antony and Levine 1997). Secondly, why
is abstractness an explanatory virtue? Thirdly, suppose that understanding is a
matter of knowledge; of knowing the causes of a phenomenon for example. How
then is it possible that omitting details could improve one’s knowledge and thereby
provide extra understanding?
Sections 2 to 4 will untangle four varieties of abstractness that have been knot-
ted together in the literature. For each variety of abstractness, I will examine
several prima facie reasons to think that the variety of abstractness in question is
an explanatory virtue. This clariﬁcatory project will also solve the puzzle of how
omitting details could be an explanatory virtue. These sections will also be criti-
1See Putnam (1973, 296–7), Garﬁnkel (1981, 91-96), Kitcher (1984), Marras (1993, 279),
Antony (1999, 16) as well as Kincaid (1986, 40–43), Kincaid (1993, 24), Kincaid (1997a) and
Potochnik (2010, 69) for talk of ‘capturing’ ‘highlighting’ or ‘bringing out’ patterns. Marchionni
(2008) talks of ‘breadth’; and MacDonald (1985, 210) of ‘generality’.
2See footnotes in Section 7.
3See the extensive citations throughout this paper. Indeed, as will be evident from the fre-
quent citation of Fodor’s work, the abstractness thesis is very similar to Fodor’s infamous multiple-
realizability thesis (Fodor 1974).
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cal, not just clariﬁcatory. I will dismiss some unhelpful arguments that conclude
that abstractness is an explanatory virtue. Indeed, I will argue in Section 5 that
a supposedly novel variety of abstractness proposed by Haug (2011b) fails to be
importantly distinct from the other four varieties of abstractness. Section 6 then
shows that these four varieties of abstractness are independent of each other.
Since my ﬁrst aim is to explore the explanatory virtue of abstractness itself,
I will initially set aside questions about the macro and the micro. Section 7 will
then return to this issue and apply the insights from the previous sections to two
typical macro versus micro cases.
2 Abstractness as Broad Jurisdiction of Generalizations
This section will focus on the generalizations that an explanation employs. It
identiﬁes two respects in which such generalizations can be relatively abstract.
But is it a virtue for an explanation to employ generalizations that are abstract in
these respects? This section explores a number of prima facie reasons to think so.
Consider the following question: what is the explanatory relationship between
mescaline ingestion and hallucination in mammals? Suppose that the threshold
dose for hallucination depends upon the species s of the mammal one is consid-
ering, its biological gender g, and its body mass m. So one can answer the above
question by supplying a function 1(s; g;m) that describes the threshold dose 1
of mescaline for each permutation of species, gender and body mass. In other
words, one can answer the question by citing the following generalization. (G1)
“Take any given mammal x and any point in time. The following conditional C
holds for any given mescaline level  above 1(s; g;m), but not for any mescaline
level below 1(s; g;m). C : if the mescaline level in mammal x had been , then x
would have hallucinated.”
Of course, this generalization should be read with an implicit proviso, very
roughly: so long as no other causes of hallucination are present. One also wants
conditional C to be read here in such a way that generalization G1 provides under-
standing of why particular hallucinations occurred, rather than merely providing
ameans to predict such hallucinations. Hempel andOppenheim (1948) would say
that this conditional is therefore to be read as a claim about the laws of nature: it’s
inconsistent with the laws of nature that the individual x receive level of mescaline
 (and several to-be-speciﬁed background factors obtain) and yet the individual
not hallucinate. Alternatively Lewis (1986) would say that the appropriate inter-
pretation is as a ‘non backtracking’ conditional. AndWoodward (2003) would say
that it’s as an ‘interventionist’ conditional. The choice here is not relevant to my
purposes, and so I leave this question open.
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Let’s focus on variable x in the preamble of a generalization such as G1, and
consider the class of individuals over which x ranges. I will call this class the
‘primary jurisdiction’ of the generalization. The primary jurisdiction of G1 for
example is all actual mammals.4
SinceG1’s primary jurisdiction is all mammals, onemight say thatG1 ‘abstracts
away’ from any particular species. Contrast this with a generalization, G2, whose
primary jurisdiction is all actual humans. Since G2 focuses on a particular species,
one might say that G2 is less abstract than G1. Here’s another way of making
the same point: G1 employs a function 1(s; g;m) that contains three variables;
in contrast G2 will employ 2(g;m), a function which contains only two of these
three variables. On this basis one might say that G1 is more abstract than G2. In
short, breadth of primary jurisdiction is a form of abstractness.
Note that, since it has a broader jurisdiction, generalization G1 can be em-
ployed in explanations of the hallucinations not just of a human called Eve, but
also of a rhesus monkey called Mojo, for example. In contrast, generalization G2
can’t be employed in explanations of Mojo’s hallucinations. This illustrates the
trivial thesis that in order for a generalization to provide understanding of each
of several cases, its jurisdiction will need to include each of those cases. It follows
that (i) there is understanding that a generalization neglects to provide, unless it
has a suﬃciently broad primary jurisdiction. Indeed (ii) the broader the jurisdic-
tion, the more understanding a generalization can provide, at least up to a point.
This I what I will mean when I say that it is a ‘virtue’ in explanatory contexts for
a generalization to have (i) a ‘suﬃciently’ broad primary jurisdiction, and (ii) an
‘increasingly’ broad primary jurisdiction. (Note that to say that something ‘can
provide’ understanding doesn’t entail that it actually does so. Thus, in talking
about explanatory virtue in this paper I am pointing to necessary conditions for
additional understanding, but not to suﬃcient conditions.)
This trivial point does not entail, however, that in order to provide under-
standing of Eve’s hallucinations, for example, a generalization will need to include
Mojo within its primary jurisdiction, as well as Eve. Thus, whenever a general-
ization provides understanding of a given case, it is a more controversial thesis to
claim that there is additional understanding of that same case that the generaliza-
tion neglects to provide, unless it has a suﬃciently broad primary jurisdiction. I
will mark the distinction between the trivial thesis and the more controversial one
4The generalization ‘All ravens are black’ is logically equivalent to ‘All non-black things aren’t
ravens’. So here we have a generalization whose primary jurisdiction is all ravens, but which is log-
ically equivalent to a generalization whose primary jurisdiction is all non-black things. So there’s
a sense in which a generalization of the form ‘All Fs are G’ has two sorts of primary jurisdiction.
See Sober (1999, footnote 9) for this worry. Note, however, that if the conditionals C in gener-
alizations like G1 are read as Lewisean or Woodwardian conditionals, then these generalizations
will not have the logical form ‘All Fs are G’, and so this problem is averted.
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as follows: the trivial thesis is that it is an ‘extrinsic’ virtue for an explanation to
employ some generalizations with a suﬃciently broad primary jurisdiction; the
controversial thesis is that it is an ‘intrinsic’ virtue.
Why believe this more controversial thesis? Some philosophers think that an
explanation provides understanding only to the extent that it uniﬁes phenomena
(Kitcher 1981; Kitcher 1989). And this principle about understanding suggests
that (i) for any given case, there is additional understanding that a generalization
neglects to provide, unless it highlights a suﬃciently broad pattern. And to high-
light a suﬃciently broad pattern, in turn, requires the generalization to have a
suﬃciently broad jurisdiction, such that it includes Mojo for example. This prin-
ciple also suggests that (ii) the broader the jurisdiction, the broader the pattern can
be, and in turn the more understanding a generalization can provide, at least up
to a point. Thus it is an intrinsic virtue for an explanation to employ some gener-
alizations with (i) a suﬃciently and (ii) an increasingly broad primary jurisdiction.
Or so some might argue.
Now, it often goes unnoticed that Fodor (1997, 157–58) proposes an alterna-
tive to this uniﬁcationist argument.5 Fodor claims that good inductive practice is
grounded in laws. We observe that all ravens in our sample are black, for exam-
ple, and we infer that the next raven we observe will also be black; and in some
sense, this inference is grounded in the law that all ravens are black. It follows,
Fodor claims, that a lawful generalization needs to have a jurisdiction that is suﬃ-
ciently broad, in order to play this grounding role in induction. That is to say, its
primary jurisdiction needs to contain all the things (all ravens, for example) over
which the inductive projection is warranted. Next, Fodor implicitly appeals to a
principle about understanding: for any given case, there is understanding that a
explanation neglects, unless it employs a lawful generalization (Hempel and Op-
penheim 1948). But this requires the generalization to have a suﬃciently broad
primary jurisdiction, Fodor has just argued. Therefore it is an intrinsic virtue for
an explanation to employ some generalizations with a suﬃciently broad primary
jurisdiction. Or so Fodor argues, as I read him.6 (Interestingly the analgous point
about increasing virtue does not follow, namely: up to a point, the broader the
jurisdiction, the more understanding a generalization can provide of a given case.)
Enough about primary jurisdictional breadth. I want to turn now to a second
sort of jurisdictional breadth, and thereby a second variety of abstractness. Con-
sider generalization G3: “Take any given mammal x and any point in time. The
following conditional C holds for any given mescaline level  between 5000 and
5This is because it is often goes unnoticed that the argument in Fodor (1997) is a considerable
the advance over Fodor (1974). For example Jaworski (2002) and Sawyer (2002) treat Fodor 1974
and Fodor 1997 as oﬀering the same argument.
6Note that Fodor talks about explanation implicitly, rather than explicitly. Sober (1999, foot-
note 17) presents a similar reading to my own, although there are some noteworthy diﬀerences.
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5001 mg, but not for any mescaline level between 0 and 1 mg. C : if the mescaline
level in mammal x had been , then x would have hallucinated.” Observe that
G1 and G3 share the same primary jurisdiction. The individual variable x in the
preamble of both G1 and G3 ranges over the same class of individuals, namely all
mammals. Notice G1’s predicate variable , however. This ranges over a class
of state-types, namely all levels of mescaline ingestion. In contrast, the predicate
variable  in generalization G3 ranges over a much narrower class of state-types,
namely all levels of mescaline ingestion between 5000 and 5001 mg, and between
0 and 1 mg.
This draws attention to a second sort of jurisdiction, namely the class of state-
types over which predicate variable  ranges. G3, for example, has smaller sec-
ondary jurisdiction than G1. For another illustration, contrast generalization G1
with generalization G4: “Take any given mammal x and any point in time. The
following conditional C holds for all mescaline levels M and all LSD levels L
where M + 7:7L is above 1. But it does not hold for any other levels. C : if the
mescaline level in mammal x had been M and the LSD level had been L, then
x would have hallucinated.” G4’s secondary jurisdiction includes an extra dimen-
sion, so to speak, namely state-types in which the individual in question ingests
a speciﬁed quantity of LSD. G1 does not include this extra dimension. So G4’s
secondary jurisdiction counts as broader.
I distinguish between the primary jurisdiction of a generalization and its sec-
ondary jurisdiction because some philosophers are committed to the breadth of
this secondary jurisdiction constituting an intrinsic virtue of an explanation, but
not the breadth of the primary jurisdiction. For example Woodward and Hitch-
cock (2003, 190) would say that the more ‘stable’ the functional relationship 1 is
‘under interventions’, the more understanding G1 can provide of any given case.
But this just means that (i) for a given case, there is additional understanding that
G1 neglects to provide unless two things hold: ﬁrstly, the conditionals C in G1 are
true when interpreted inWoodward’s interventionist way and, secondly, the pred-
icate variable  ranges over a suﬃciently broad range of state-types. And indeed
(ii) up to a point, the broader the range of state types, the more understanding
G1 can provide of a given case. So, for Woodward, it is an intrinsic virtue for
an explanation to employ some generalizations with (i) a suﬃciently and (ii) an
increasingly broad secondary jurisdiction.
Another way of looking at this is that generalizations with a broad secondary
jurisdiction allow one to answermany ‘what if things had been diﬀerent’ questions,
andWoodward (2003) endorses a principle about understanding that says that this
ability is an intrinsic virtue of an explanation (Ylikoski and Kuorikoski 2010). For
this reason, I think that the distinction between the primary jurisdiction and the
secondary jurisdiction of a generalization is worth emphasizing. (Much more on
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the relationship between a generalization’s primary and secondary jurisdiction in
Section 6.) Unfortunately the ubiquitous talk in the literature of the ‘scope’ of a
generalization tends to obscure this distinction.7
In sum, this section has articulated two ways in which one might consider a
generalization to be abstract: it has a broad primary jurisdiction, or a broad sec-
ondary jurisdiction. This section then drew a novel distinction between intrinsic
versus extrinsic virtues. I noted that many philosophers think that it is an intrin-
sic virtue for an explanation to employ some suﬃciently or perhaps increasingly
abstract generalizations. And I identiﬁed several general principles about under-
standing to which one might be tempted to appeal in order to make this point,
principles that connect understanding to uniﬁcation, to laws or to answering what-
if questions.
3 Abstractness as Logical Modesty of the Factors Cited
Why was the pressure in a given chamber of gas 100 pascals? Answer: because
(a) its temperature was 300 kelvin, and its volume was 3 metres-cubed; and (b)
pressure, volume and temperature are governed by the law that PV = T . Sec-
tion 2 articulated two respects in which the generalizations that an explanation
employs, such as b, can be relatively abstract. This section will instead articulate
a respect in which the particular factors that an explanation includes, such as a,
can be relatively abstract. And it will explore a number of prima facie reasons to
think that it is a virtue for an explanation to exclude less abstract factors, or to
include more abstract ones.
Firstly, let’s ask: why did Eve hallucinate? Modest assertion: she ingested over
1000mg of mescaline. (This is true.) Bold assertion: she ingested over 1000mg
of mescaline and is a lawyer. (This is also true.) Note that the second assertion
logically entails the ﬁrst one, but not vice versa. That’s why the second one counts
as logically bolder, and the ﬁrst as logically more modest. What’s more, the mod-
est assertion doesn’t contain the detail about Eve’s profession. This illustrates an
intuitive sense in which logically modest assertions ‘abstract away’ from logically
bolder ones.
Now it seems that the bold assertion provides an incorrect explanation of Eve’s
hallucinations, unlike the modest assertion. And this is despite the fact that both
assertions are true. Somehow, asserting more about the world sometimes makes
for an incorrect explanation. What general principle accounts for this curious
phenomenon?
7See Armstrong (1983) and Little (1993) for example for this ambiguous talk of ‘scope’.
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Let’s make the standard distinction between the semantic content of an asser-
tion versus what the assertion pragmatically conveys. When Sorana asserts for
example that the room is hot, she conveys that Sorana wants the window opened.
But Sorana does not thereby explicitly assert that this is what she wants. This is a
standard case of pragmatics at work. And one can treat the explanation of Eve’s
hallucination in a similar way, I suggest.
Let’s start with the logically modest assertion: Eve ingested over 1000mg of
mescaline. This assertion conveys, I claim, that if Eve had ingested any dose of
mescaline over 1000mg then she would have hallucinated, but if she had ingested
any dose under this level then she would not. This generalization is true. Things
are diﬀerent in the case of the logically bold assertion, however: Eve ingested over
1000mg of mescaline and is a lawyer. One of the things that this assertion conveys
is perhaps that (c) if Eve hadn’t been a lawyer then she wouldn’t have hallucinated,
even if she had ingested any given amount of mescaline. Alternatively, one of the
things that it conveys is perhaps that (d) if Eve had ingested any given amount
of mescaline, but had remained a lawyer, then she would still have hallucinated.
But both generalization c and d are false. So on either reading of what the bold
assertion conveys, it conveys a false generalization. (I will call the logically modest
and the logically bold assertions ‘laconic explanations’ to mark the fact that these
explanations convey the above generalizations by pragmatic implication, rather
than by directly asserting them.)
What’s more, c and d aren’t Galilean idealizations, to use Cartwright’s termi-
nology. To see this, consider the falsehood that if any two objects were oppositely-
charged then theywouldmove closer to each other. This falsehood about oppositely-
charged objects is a Galilean idealization in the following respect. The falsehood
becomes true if one qualiﬁes it with the proviso ‘if all the other factors that cause
objects to move were neutralized’. In contrast, c and d remain false when they are
qualiﬁed with the proviso ‘if all the other factors that cause hallucinations were
neutralized’. But I follow Cartwright (2007, chapter 15) in endorsing the follow-
ing general principle about explanation: Galilean idealizations are more or less
the only falsehoods (if any) that can form part of correct explanations. It follows
that the logically bold assertion provides an incorrect explanation.
This illustrates how the pragmatics of explanation-giving allows us to resolve
the paradox that asserting a logically bolder truth—one that speciﬁes Eve’s profes-
sion—can annihilate the correctness of an explanation. Unless a laconic explana-
tion excludes factors that are too logically bold, the explanation will not be correct,
and therefore will not provide any understanding of the case in question. Thus it
is an intrinsic virtue for a laconic explanation to exclude suﬃciently bold factors.
(Note that this reasoning does not establish the analogous claim about increasing
virtue, namely: up to a point, the more modest the factors that an explanation
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excludes, the more understanding it can provide.)
Secondly, let’s consider a slightly modiﬁed example: why did Eve hallucinate?
Bold assertion: she ingested exactly 2500mg of mescaline. (This is true.) Modest
assertion: she ingested over 1000mg of mescaline. (This is also true.) Note that
the ﬁrst assertion (that Eve ingested exactly 2500mg) logically entails the second
assertion (that Eve ingested at least 1000mg), but not vice versa. That’s why the
second assertion counts as more logically modest, and thereby as abstracting away
from the ﬁrst assertion. It doesn’t specify the exact dosage that Eve ingested.
Which explanation provides more understanding? Here’s my suggestion. The
bold assertion conveys that if Eve were to ingest 2500mgmescaline then she would
hallucinate, but if she ingested no mescaline then she would not. This is ensured
by the pragmatics of explanation-giving. But the modest assertion conveys the
following: for any  above 1000mg, if Eve were to ingest  mg mescaline then
she would hallucinate; but for any  below 1000mg, she would not.8 Thus the
modest assertion conveys a generalization with a broader secondary jurisdiction.
So the modest assertion can oﬀer understanding that the bold assertion neglects,
according to the Woodwardian principle discussed in Section 2. It allows us to
answer more ‘what if things had been diﬀerent’ questions. (And I will endorse
Woodward’s principle throughout the rest of this paper as a good measure of un-
derstanding, or of at least one aspect thereof.)
This illustrates how (i) for any given case, there is understanding that a laconic
explanation neglects, unless it includes some factors that are suﬃciently logically
modest. Indeed (ii) up to a point, the more logically modest some of these fac-
tors are, the more understanding a laconic explanation can provide of the case
in question. In other words, it is an intrinsic virtue for a laconic explanation to
include some (i) suﬃciently and (ii) increasingly modest factors. This time, it’s not
a matter of avoiding conveying falsehoods, but a matter of conveying more truths.
And it is not a matter of excluding any relatively bold factors, but of including
some relatively modest ones.9
At this stage, I should note that there is an alternative way of making the above
point that does not rely so heavily on pragmatics. The basic idea is that the log-
ically modest factors cited above ‘made a diﬀerence’ to Eve’s hallucinations, but
8My treatment bears some similarity to Jackson and Pettit’s (1992) treatment of similar cases.
One important diﬀerence is that my account shows that the logically modest assertion provides
both more ‘modally comparative’ information and more ‘modally contrastive’ information—to
use their terminology. Jackson and Pettit are mistaken when they claim that logically modest as-
sertions provide more comparative information, and logically bold assertions provide more con-
trastive information. My treatment also has aﬃnities with that of Marchionni (2008) who also
appeals to implicit explanatory contrasts.
9To see the diﬀerence, consider a hybrid explanation that included both this logically modest
factor and this logically bold factor.
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the logically bolder factors did not. One then appeals to the following principle
about understanding: an explanation neglects some understanding, unless it cites
diﬀerence-making factors. However this approach—favoured by Garﬁnkel (1981,
57–65), Yablo (1992, x8), and Strevens (2008)—uses a very restrictive notion of
diﬀerence-making. To treat this approach adequately would require another pa-
per in itself; suﬃce it to say that this restrictive understanding of diﬀerence-making
is highly controversial.10
Finally, according to some philosophers there is another reason to regard the
inclusion of some relatively modest factors as a virtue. On their view, all other
things being equal, an explanation of Eve’s hallucinations is better than an al-
ternative insofar as it can be applied to more cases—for example to Mojo the
monkey’s hallucinations.11 Unfortunately it is unclear what these philosophers
take the added beneﬁt here to be.12 Is it merely that the explanation of Eve’s hal-
lucinations can be used as a template for an explanation of Mojo the monkey’s
hallucination? Or is it also that the explanation provides understanding of Eve’s
hallucination itself that the alternative explanation does not? In other words, do
these philosophers take this ability (of being applicable to many cases) to be an
extrinsic virtue or instead an intrinsic one?
Some philosophers will think that this ability is an intrinsic virtue because they
endorse the uniﬁcationist principle about understanding that I discussed in Sec-
tion 2: the more ‘cases’ or ‘systems’ to which an explanation ‘can be applied’, the
broader a pattern it can highlight, and so the more understanding it can provide
of a given case. Now, talk of ‘applying’ an explanation of one case to another isn’t
entirely straightforward, I’d say. But I assume that it requires that an explanation
of Eve’s hallucinations, for example, includes some factors that are also present in
Mojo’s case, and that also provide understanding of Mojo’s hallucinations. Take
for example the factor of ingesting over 1000mg of mescaline, which provides un-
derstanding of both Eve’s hallucinations and of Mojo’s (see Section 2). Thus, the
more possible cases in which a cited factor is present, the more understanding of
a given case can be provided by citing it. In other words, it is an intrinsic virtue
for an explanation to include some suﬃciently and indeed increasingly modest
factors. Or so some would argue.
To summarize, this section has examined the particular factors that an ex-
planation includes. And it has articulated a respect—logical modesty—in which
these factors can be abstract. This is perhaps the notion of abstractness that Block
(1995, x3.3), Weslake (2010) and maybe Putnam (1967, 437) and Kincaid (1990,
10See Weatherson (2012), Shaprio and Sober (2012), and Franklin-Hall (Forthcoming, x5) for
various problems.
11See Putnam (1973, 296), Block (1995, x3.3) and Weslake (2010) for this view. Marchionni
(2008) and Potochnik (2010) endorses a qualiﬁed version of this view too.
12See Sober (1999) and Weslake (2010, 291) for illustrations of this ambiguity.
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63) have in mind.13 I examined how a uniﬁcationist principle about understand-
ing suggests that it is an intrinsic virtue for any given explanation to include factors
that are logically modest. I also examined the special case of laconic explanations.
I appealed to pragmatics and to Woodward’s principle about understanding to
show that it is a intrinsic virtue for a laconic explanation to exclude factors that
are suﬃciently logically bold; and that it is an intrinsic virtue to include some
factors that are suﬃciently and indeed increasingly logically modest.
4 Abstractness as Syntactic Simplicity or Cognitive Transparency
This section will articulate one ﬁnal way of deﬁning the abstractness of the parts
of an explanation. And I will explore some prima facie reasons to think that this
ﬁnal variety of abstractness is a virtue.
Suppose that a chamber of nitrogen gas is connected to a piston. A ﬂame
heats the chamber, expanding the nitrogen gas, and thereby moving the piston.
Why did the internal energy of the chamber increase? Complex answer: because
(
p
Q +
p
W )(
p
Q   pW ) > 0, where Q is the heat that the ﬂame supplies to
the chamber, and W is the work done by the chamber on the piston. Simple
answer: because the heat supplied by the ﬂame to the chamber was greater than
the work done by the chamber on the piston, Q > W in formal terms. Note that
Q > W is mathematically equivalent to (
p
Q +
p
W )(
p
Q   pW ) > 0 and so
these two answers are logically equivalent. Nevertheless the simple answer has a
simpler syntax than the complex answer. Is such syntactic simplicity a virtue of
explanations?
Kincaid (1986, 1993, 1997a) and perhaps Marras (1993, 284) seem to argue
as follows. (1) It is an intrinsic virtue for an explanation to employ lawful gener-
alizations. This is because such generalizations ‘capture patterns’. So the ability
of a concept to feature in lawful generalizations is an intrinsic virtue in explana-
tory contexts.14 But (2) to feature in lawful generalizations, a concept needs to be
suﬃciently syntactically simple. Very long disjunctions cannot feature in lawful
generalizations, for example. Therefore it is an intrinsic virtue for the concepts
that an explanation employs to be suﬃciently syntactically simple.
Now, if this argument is to be convincing, it needs to be supplemented with
a description of the deﬁning features of lawful generalizations. Otherwise one
will be unable to satisfactorily evaluate premise two, the premise that a concept
13Haug (2011a) may also interpret Fodor (1997) this way, but I’m skeptical of this interpretation.
14Kincaid (1986, 40–43)makes an interesting distinction between ‘type explanations’ and ‘token
explanations’ and says that this argument is focusing on the former. See Marras (1993, 196) for a
similar idea.
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needs to be syntactically simple in order to feature in lawful generalizations. (The
appeals in the literature to vague hunches in support of premise two are unhelpful
here, I suggest.) Therefore I will consider two putative deﬁning features of lawful
generalizations to which Kincaid might appeal. Unfortunately his argument fails
on both of these interpretations, I will argue. (The argument also fails for other
deﬁnitions of lawful generalizations, such as David Lewis’ or Marc Lange’s (2009,
16), I would also contend.)
The ﬁrst interpretation is that by a lawful generalization Kincaid just means
an explanatory generalization. Take for example the generalization that if any
two objects were oppositely-charged then they would move closer to each other.
This generalization is explanatory in that it provides understanding of an object’s
motion (for example according toWoodward’s principle about understanding dis-
cussed in Section 2). However, on this interpretation of Kincaid’s argument, no-
tice that premise two comes to mean the following: a concept needs to be syntacti-
cally simple in order to feature in explanatory generalizations. But this is basically
a re-statement of the conclusion of Kincaid’s argument. In other words, on this in-
terpretation, premise one becomes redundant and Kincaid’s argument becomes
circular. (Indeed this criticism also applies to a similar argument presented in
Fodor (1974).)15
Let’s turn therefore to a second interpretation of Kincaid’s argument: by a
lawful generalization Kincaid means a generalization that has a special sort of ev-
idential status. To illustrate just one sort of special evidential status, take the case
in which one discovers a sample of water that freezes at zero degrees centigrade.
This sample is a positive instance of the generalization that all water freezes at
zero degrees. A popular thought is that, when one discovers any such positive
instance, this discovery always lends extra evidential support to the above gen-
eralization. Indeed take any second sample of water. A similar thought is that,
when one discovers this ﬁrst positive instance, this discovery always lends extra ev-
idential support to the hypothesis that this second sample will also freeze at zero
degrees. To think either of these things is to think that the above generalization
has the special evidential status of being ‘instance conﬁrmable’ (Goodman 1954).
In short, my second interpretation of what Kincaid means by a lawful general-
ization is that he just means a generalization that has a special evidential status,
instance conﬁrmability for example.
On this second interpretation, however, I’m strongly inclined to think that
premise one of Kincaid’s argument is false. That is to say, I deny that a general-
15It is fair to interpret Fodor (1974), as Kincaid does, as making a similar claim: syntactic
simplicity is required for a concept to feature in explanatory generalizations. But Fodor confesses
that his argument for this claim is somewhat circular (102). This is in contrast to Fodor’s more
developed (1997) treatment, which I discussed in Section 2.
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ization’s evidential status makes any contribution to its explanatory virtue.16 The
ability of a generalization to help one understand a given phenomenon does not
depend, I’d say, on how one came to know the generalization, or upon how one
might have come to know it. Indeed in another context Kincaid agrees; he is
adamant that these two things are independent (Kincaid 1996, 94). So Kincaid’s
argument fails on this second interpretation, and by his own lights. (To those who
remain unconvinced, let me oﬀer another reason to think that Kincaid’s argument
fails: on the present interpretation, the second premise of the argument comes to
mean: a concept needs to be syntactically simple, if it is to be part of a general-
ization with a special evidential status. This premise is also dubious, I’d say. This
is because two logically equivalent propositions always enjoy the same degree of
evidential support, as is generally acknowledged. It follows that if one of these two
generalizations enjoys a special evidential status, then the other does too; even if
the ﬁrst is much more syntactically simple than the second.)
Let’s take stock. We are examining Kincaid’s hunch that syntactically simple
explanations can provide understanding than syntactically complex ones cannot.
For example, the hunch is that the simple Q > W answer provides understanding
that the complex (
p
Q +
p
W )(
p
Q   pW ) > 0 answer does not, when it comes
to explaining why the internal energy of the chamber increased. But, so far, this
remains a bare-faced contention. We do not yet have a satisfying argument that
justiﬁes this contention or that accounts for it. It’s time to put this right.
Note that the syntactical simplicity of the Q > W answer makes its logi-
cal implications more cognitively transparent than those of the more complex
(
p
Q +
p
W )(
p
Q   pW ) > 0 answer. For example, the simple answer makes it
transparent that the energy of the chamber would increase if Q = 3 and W = 2.
The complex answer does not make this relationship cognitively transparent; it
obscures it from us, or at least from any cognitively normal person. But knowing
this relationship betweenQ andW and energy increase provides understanding of
the energy increase. (On Woodward’s principle, for example, this is because this
relationship tells us what would happen if Q or W were diﬀerent.) Therefore the
simple answer makes more transparent the knowledge that we require to explain
the energy increase, unlike the complex answer. And so the syntactically simple
answer provides more understanding of the energy increase than the syntactically
complex one. (And this is despite the fact that both explanations are logically
equivalent.)
What’s more, one might feel that there is a sense in which the syntactically
16For one thing, see Sober (1988) for a compelling argument that the importance of instance
conﬁrmability has been overstated. I should also note, however, that my contention here leaves
open the question of whether evidential status can ever serve as a rough indicator of explanatory
virtue. Antony (1999), for example, would say that instance conﬁrmability indicates that a gener-
alization refers to natural kinds, and thereby indicates its explanatory virtue.
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simple and cognitively transparent answer ‘abstracts away from the messy details’
of the complex answer. Thus the above discussion illustrates how abstractness qua
cognitive transparency is an intrinsic virtue: the more cognitive transparency an
explanation provides, the more understanding an explanation can oﬀer of a given
case. This also illustrates how abstractness qua syntactic simplicity is an intrinsic
virtue—for cognitively normal people—because syntactic simplicity is required
for cognitive transparency. So Kincaid’s hunch is vindicated, even though his
argument is not.
I hope that this example also makes clear that, for cognitively perfect beings,
syntactic simplicity is not an explanatory virtue. Imagine, for example, a mathe-
matician for whom mathematical reasoning is so eﬀortless that the Q > W expla-
nation and the (
p
Q+
p
W )(
p
Q pW ) > 0 explanation are equally cognitively
transparent. In this case we have two entirely synonymous and equally cogni-
tively transparent explanations. Now, understanding depends upon precisely two
things, I contend: what the explanation in question says about the world, and how
the explanation is cognitively processed. But, in this case, the two explanations
say logically equivalent things about the world, and are cognitively processed in
the same way. So neither explanation provides understanding that the other does
not provide. This illustrates how cognitively perfect beings can have complete un-
derstanding without syntactic simplicity. For them it is not an explanatory virtue.
5 Abstraction and Causal Proﬁles
I now move on to consider a ﬁnal variety of abstractness. This variety is formu-
lated by Haug (2011a, 2011b) in an ingenious, if rather tricky, body of work. What
follows is my best attempt at a simple and fair exegesis. Haug wants his variety of
abstractness to be importantly distinct from the other varieties discussed so far. I
will conclude, however, that this fails to be the case.
I will take the ingestion of morphine as an illustration. (Even though the exam-
ple is my own, I will pretend it is Haug’s to avoid cumbersome locutions such as
‘Haug would say’ and the like.) Now, any ingestion of morphine has the power (i)
to slow down the heart and lungs, and in extreme amounts to induce organ failure;
and it has the power (ii) to relieve pain and to inhibit pain aversion behaviours.17
In other words morphine is both (i) a vaso-suppressant and (ii) an analgesic. For
simplicity of illustration let’s pretend that (i) and (ii) describe precisely those causal
powers that are shared by all morphine ingestion events, as dictated by the laws of
nature. These are all and only the causal powers ‘nomically associated’ with the
property of morphine ingestion, as I will put it. They constitute the ‘full nomic
17No worries if you think that it’s ingestees not ingestions that possess the powers.
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proﬁle’ of the property of morphine ingestion.
Again to keep the example simple, let’s also pretend that morphine is the only
nomically possible vaso-suppressant.18 So every ingestion of a vaso-suppressant is
the very same event as an ingestion of morphine, and vice versa; or so one might
infer.19 Therefore, the property of morphine ingestion and the property of vaso-
suppressant ingestion are, by my deﬁnition, nomically associated with exactly the
same powers. Each of their full nomic proﬁles is described by (i) and (ii), to be
speciﬁc (Haug 2011b, 253, 257).
Now imagine that Juliet drinks a potion, her heart stops, and she dies. Why
did Juliet die? Answer MO: she ingested morphine. (This is true.) Answer VS:
she ingested a vaso-suppressant. (This is also true.) Haug says that VS adds to
the understanding provided by MO. This is because VS abstracts away from MO,
Haug claims.
In what respect does VS abstract away from MO according to Haug? Haug
(2011b, 259) claims that there is an intuitive and important sense in which vaso-
supressant ingestion isn’t associated with the power to relieve pain. Let’s say this
property is not ‘Haug-associated’ with the power to relieve pain. In contrast, the
property of morphine ingestion is Haug-associated with the power to relieve pain,
he claims. But Haug then contends that the power to relieve pain is irrelevant
to the explanation of Juliet’s death. (Instead it’s the potion’s power to slow down
the heart and lungs that is relevant.) So there’s a sense in which the MO expla-
nation appeals to causal powers that are irrelevant to explaining Juliet’s death.
In contrast, the VS explanation ‘abstracts away’ from the causal powers that are
irrelevant to the explanation. Therefore the VS explanation provides understand-
ing of Juliet’s death that theMO explanation does not provide, Haug argues (259).
And so the above variety of abstractness is a virtue of explanations, Haug argues:
without it, some understanding is neglected.
But what does Haug association amount to, one might wonder? It is evi-
dent from my exposition above that Haug is committed to the following claim:
a causal power (relieving pain) can be nomically associated with a property (vaso-
suppressant ingestion) without being Haug-associated with that property.20 So
Haug is working with a conception of association that is not nomic association.
18As Haug (2011b, x5) urges, however, the following reasoning would still apply if one drops
this pretense. Simply replace ‘morphine’ with a very long disjunction of all the possible vaso-
suppressants.
19Although Haug (2011b, 253, 257) accepts this, one might dispute this. One might prefer
instead to say that the ingestion of morphine is a distinct event from the ingestion of a vaso-
suppresant. It’s just that the two events are necessarily concurrent. But see Clarke (Manuscript–b)
for an argument that my conclusion follows anyway: necessarily concurrent events have exactly
the same causal powers.
20This is tantamount to Haug’s (2011b, 253) rejection of what he calls the Absolute Closure
principle.
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Unfortunately Haug leaves it very much open what it is for a property to be Haug-
associated with a causal power.
Putting this serious interpretative worry aside, I’m happy to endorse Haug’s
conclusion that VS provides some understanding that MO does not. Here’s my
own account of the diﬀerence. VSmakes the potion’s power to slow down the heart
cognitively salient. And this inﬂuences the pragmatics of the VS explanation: VS
hints that if Juliet’s heartbeat hadn’t been slowed down, then she would not have
died—for example if Juliet had been given a dose of naloxone immediately after
drinking the potion.21 And this true proposition provides understanding of Juliet’s
death. (For example, it answers an important ‘what if things had been diﬀerent
question’.) MO in contrast does not do this. InsteadMOmakes the potion’s power
to relieve pain cognitively salient. So if anything, MO hints that if Juliet had been
in pain, then she would not have died—for example if her dorsal posterior insula
had been directly stimulated. And this proposition is false. So VS andMO hint at
diﬀerent things. And, as a result, VS makes more cognitively salient the knowledge
needed to provide understanding of the case, in contrast to MO which perhaps
makes a false proposition more cognitively salient.
To underline my point, let’s consider two further explanations of why Juliet
died. Answer VS+: she ingested a vaso-suppressant, and such ingestions are able
to slow down the heart and lungs. AnswerMO+: she ingested morphine, and such
ingestions are able to slow down the heart and lungs. I hope that the reader shares
my hunch that MO+ provides at least as much understanding of Juliet’s death as
the VS+ explanation. (According to the account I’ve just given, this is because
both VS+ andMO+ highlight the power of the potion to slow down the heart and
lungs. Thus both explanations provide the same understanding, in that they make
cognitively salient the fact that if Juliet’s heartbeat hadn’t been slowed down, then
she would not have died.)
I conclude that the only diﬀerence betweenMO on the one hand, and VS and
VS+ and MO+ on the other, is that MO doesn’t make the power of the ingested
potion to slow down the heart and lungs cognitively salient. It follows that Haug
abstractness (whatever it is) is only an explanatory virtue insofar as it provides this
sort of cognitive saliency. Therefore Haug abstractness fails to be importantly
distinct from abstractness as cognitive transparency that I discussed in Section 4.
Instead it’s just a special case of the latter.
21Perhaps VS doesn’t quite pragmatically imply this, but VS at least makes this proposition more
cognitively salient.
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6 The Independence of the Varieties of Abstractness
Having articulated four respects in which part of an explanation can be abstract,
I now want to note that these varieties of abstractness are independent of each
other in the following sense. One can make part of an explanation less/more
abstract in one of these four respects without making it less/more abstract in the
other three respects, in principle if not in practice. (I talk of parts of explanations
because explanations are complex: an explanation can have one part that is more
abstract than another explanation, and a second part that is less abstract.)
Consider the following explanation of why Eve hallucinated: (a) Eve is a fe-
male human weighing 70kg, (b) Eve ingested over 1000mg of mescaline; (c) for
any mammal and any mescaline level  above 1(s; g;m), if the mescaline level
in mammal x had been , then x would have hallucinated; where (d) 1(human,
female, 70) = 1000mg. Note that one can narrow the primary jurisdiction of
generalization c by replacing ‘for any mammal’ with ‘for any human’. One can
narrow the secondary jurisdiction of generalization c by replacing ‘any mescaline
level  above 1(s; g;m)’ with ‘any mescaline level  above 1(s; g;m) + 4000mg’.
One can make some of the cited factors more logically modest by replacing ‘in-
gested over 1000 mg’ with ‘ingested precisely 1500 mg’ in b. And one can make
b less cognitively transparent by rewriting ‘over 1000mg’ with the mathematicaly
equivalent description:
> 10(
4X
i=1
i)2
Note that each of these changes is independent of the other. For example, the
above change to the cognitive transparency of b doesn’t change its logical modesty.
Nor, for example, does narrowing the breadth of the primary jurisdiction of c (to
only humans) change its breadth of secondary jurisdiction (all levels of mescaline
ingestion above 1000mg).
I want to add two caveats to my independence claim here. Firstly, my inde-
pendence claim does not deny that, in practice, parts of an explanation that are
abstract in one respect may tend to also be abstract in other respects. Imagine that
one conjoined ‘Eve ingested over 1000mg of mescaline’ in b with ‘Eve is a lawyer’
to form ‘Eve ingested over 1000mg of mescaline and is a lawyer’. This change
makes b less abstract in two respects. It now employs logically bolder factors, and
it is now more syntactically complex. So, conversely, there will be cases in which
the most natural way of making part of an explanation more abstract—removing
‘Eve is a lawyer’—makes it more abstract in at least two respects.
Secondly, my independence claim does not deny that there is sometimes an
interesting evidential relationship between a generalization’s primary and sec-
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ondary jurisdictions. For illustration, take any iron surface that is actually exposed
to oxygen, and call it x1. And take the state-type 2 of being damp. Suppose one
knows that any such surface would rust if it were damp. And now take a second
iron surface that is actually damp, and call it x2. And take the state-type 1 of
being exposed to oxygen. One might reasonably infer from our knowledge about
the ﬁrst surface that this second surface would rust if it were exposed to oxygen.
It is interesting to note, however, that such inferences won’t always be rea-
sonable. Example one: suppose one knows that any given person who actually
lives in a region of the Himalayas (x1) would donate money to charitable causes
if they were (2) to be given a million dollars. It might not be reasonable to in-
fer, however, that any actual millionaire (x2) would donate money to charitable
causes if they were (1) to live in this region of the Himalayas. Example two: any
given person who actually has an XY chromosome (x1) would have bad lungs if
they were (2) to smoke cigarettes. This is a straightforward supposition. But it’s
not at all straightforward to say of any actual smoker (x2) that they would have
bad lungs if they were (1) to have an XY chromosome. This is because it’s not
clear that it makes sense to entertain the possibility of an individual changing their
chromosomal make-up from XX to XY.
In summary, one can make part of an explanation less/more abstract in one of
the four respects without making it less/more abstract in the other three respects.
However, there will be cases in which the most natural way of making part of an
explanation less/more abstract will indeed make it less/more abstract in two or
more respects.
7 How Abstract are Typical Macro Explanations?
Having articulated four ways in which part of an explanation can abstract away
from another, I want to apply the lessons learned to two typical cases of a macro
explanation versus a micro explanation. I must leave it as a task for another day,
however, to consider how this bears on macro versus micro cases that are dis-
similar to the following two cases (Potochnik 2010; Clarke Manuscript–a). (This
task is an important one: to show in this manner that some macro explanations
are not replaceable by any micro explanation without loss of understanding, one
would have to show that some macro explanations abstract away from all micro
explanations of the same phenomenon. I also note that this task is complicated
by the ambiguity surrounding what counts as a macro concept or micro concept,
and therefore what counts as a macro explanation or a micro explanation.)
Case One. In 1990 over one million people carry the herpes virus. Imagine
an epidemiologist who has the resources to consider one million carriers in 1990
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individually. For each of the million carriers she traces the idiosyncratic sequence
of infections that led to the carrier’s being infected. In Patrick’s case for exam-
ple she traces the sequence of herpes infection from Vinesh to Alex to Caitlin to
Patrick. (And to explain why Caitlin infected Patrick, for instance, she employs
the generalization that for all individuals, if they were to have unprotected sex
with someone carrying the virus, the chances of being infected is high.) Thus this
epidemiologist identiﬁes one million such causal sequences. And these sequences,
taken together, were suﬃcient in the circumstances for there to be at least one mil-
lion carriers. The epidemiologist claims that this explains why there were at least
one million herpes carriers in 1990. I am going to assume that this explanation is
correct; if only for illustrative purposes.22
Contrast this with a second epidemiologist who correctly explains why over
one million people carried herpes in 1990. The epidemiologist notes that the so-
ciety in question is a conservative society: condoms are not freely available, and
their use is frowned upon. The epidemiologist also notes that the network of sexual
relationships in the society has a ‘scale free structure’. This epidemiologist then
provides a general equation that links the incidence of the virus at any given point
in time, to the incidence of the virus a year later, given the scale-free structure of
the society and given the society’s conservativeness. One instance of this general-
ization is the following: if there were over 900 000 carriers in 1989 (which there
were) then there would be over one million carriers in 1990. Thus the second
epidemiologist explains why there were over one million carriers in 1990.
Note that this second explanation employs some concepts that, one is inclined
to say, are about whole populations, such as a society’s being conservative or scale-
free. The ﬁrst explanation only uses concepts that are about individual people, in
contrast. Thus most philosophers would count the second explanation as macro
relative to the ﬁrst explanation. So let’s ask whether any parts of this macro ex-
planation abstract away from any parts of this micro explanation. Sections 2 to 4
have articulated four varieties of abstractness, so we can make this question more
precise as follows.
(I ) Take the individual variable x in the preamble of the generalization that
the macro epidemiologist employs. Does x range over a broader class of things
than the generalization that the micro epidemiologist employs? No. In fact, the
two classes are disjoint, strictly speaking. The micro epidemiologist employs a
22Many would argue that this epidemiologist has not identiﬁed what caused this phenomenon,
but rather what caused each of the mereological parts of this phenomenon, as it were. See Putnam
(1973, 296–8) and Garﬁnkel (1981) for advocates of this extreme skepticism. Jackson and Pettit
(1992), Kincaid (1997a), Sober (1999) and Marchionni (2008) repudiate it. See Owens (1989)
for an excellent discussion of the general issues involved. See Kitcher (1984), MacDonald (1992,
86, 90–92) and Haug (2011a, 1150) for the claim that the present explanation includes irrelevant
details.
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generalization that generalizes over the class of all individual humans; the macro
epidemiologist employs a generalization that generalizes over the class of all pop-
ulations of humans.
(II ) Similarly, does the predicate variable  in the preamble of the macro gen-
eralization range over a broader class of state-types? No. In fact, the two classes
are again disjoint, strictly speaking. The micro epidemiologist employs a gener-
alization that generalizes over the following state types: ‘unprotected sex’ versus
‘protected sex’, and ‘sexual partner already infected’ versus ‘sexual partner not
already infected’. In contrast, the macro epidemiologist employs a generalization
that generalizes over the following state types: ‘conservative’ versus ‘not conserva-
tive’, and ‘scale free’ versus ‘not scale free’. (Now, the macro epidemiologist’s gen-
eralization answers what-if questions additional to those answered by the micro
epidemiologist’s generalization, and thus it provides additional understanding, on
Woodward’s principle from Section 2. But this is not because it is more abstract.
It isn’t, I’ve just shown.)
(III ) Are some of the particular factors cited in the macro explanation more
logically modest than the micro explanation? Yes. Consider the thesis that 900
000 particular (named) individuals carry herpes. Obviously this thesis entails that
at least 900 000 individuals carry herpes. But the reverse does not hold. The fact
that at least 900 000 unspeciﬁed individuals carry herpes does not entail that it’s
the individuals named above who carry it. So the factor cited in the macro expla-
nation “there are at least 900 000 carriers in 1989” is more logically modest than
the factor cited in the micro explanation, which identiﬁes 900 000 carriers in 1989
by name. (However, since the micro epidemiologist’s explanation is not a laconic
one—which conveys explanatory generalizations by pragmatic implication—the
relevance of this point is questionable; see Section 3.)
(IV ) Do the simple syntactic features of the macro explanation make it more
cognitively transparent than the micro explanation? Yes. The micro explana-
tion is very complex, describing one million particular causal sequences of herpes
transmission.
In sum, in this typical pair of explanations, the macro explanation abstracts
away from the micro explanation in two respects, but as far as the other respects
are concerned, neither explanation abstracts away from the other.
Case Two. On 9th April 2015 the cover story of Time Magazine was entitled
‘Black Lives Matter.’ A micro explanation of this event is that ﬁve days previously
Michael Slager (a police oﬃcer) killed Walter Scott (an African-American citizen)
by shooting him in the back eight times. A macro explanation of this event is that
police forces in the United States (continue to) use excessive force against their
citizens, in particular against African-Americans. Many would count the latter as
a relatively macro explanation because it refers to whole police forces and whole
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populations, rather than to two individuals.
Both explanations are equally syntactically simple, more or less. And neither
explanation appeals to any generalization, and so both have the same (trivial)
primary and secondary jurisdiction. Where the explanations do diﬀer, however,
is the logical modesty of the factors that they cite. Take the fact that a police oﬃcer
called Slager shot an African-American citizen called Scott eight times in the back;
this entails that police forces in the United States sometimes use excessive force
against African-Americans. But the reverse entailment doesn’t hold. And so the
macro explanation abstracts away from the micro explanation, in the sense that
some of the factors that it employs are more logically modest.
8 Implications
The notion of an abstract explanation plays a central role in the philosophy of
biology, mind and social science. But many authors leave the notion of abstract-
ness entirely vague (Kitcher 1984; Kincaid 1986; Pereboom and Kornblith 1991;
Antony and Levine 1997). This paper has articulated four ways of deﬁning the
abstractness of the parts of an explanation. This follows in the footsteps of Sober
(1999) and Weslake (2010), who attempt something similar. By drawing together
disparate work across the philosophy of mind, biology, and social science, this pa-
per oﬀers a more comprehensive taxonomy. Its taxonomy is also an advance on
Sober and Weslake’s in that it draws a number of helpful distinctions: between a
generalization’s primary and secondary jurisdiction; between extrinsic and intrin-
sic explanatory virtues; between the virtue of suﬃcient abstractness and of increas-
ing abstractness; and indeed between the virtue of including more abstract factors
and the virtue of excluding less abstract ones. It also distinguished the question of
what is virtuous for laconic explanations, what is virtuous for explanations given
by cognitively normal humans, and what is virtuous for all explanations in general.
It also separated the task of characterizing abstractness, the task of appealing to
general principles about understanding in order to evaluate its explanatory virtue,
and the application of these results to the micro–macro case.
Thus this paper has shown that the apparent consensus in the philosophical
literature on macro explanations is illusory. Philosophers diﬀer on how they un-
derstand abstractness, and for each variety of abstractness there are several alter-
native reasons to think that the variety of abstractness in question is an explanatory
virtue (Sections 2 to 4). Having untangled these varieties of abstractness, and these
several reasons to think abstractness a virtue, one was able to solve the puzzle of
how omitting details could be an explanatory virtue (Sections 2 and 3). My aims
in this paper, however, have not only been clariﬁcatory but also critical. I have
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dismissed some unhelpful arguments from Fodor, Marras and Kincaid to the ef-
fect that abstractness qua syntatic simplicity is an explanatory virtue (Sections 4).
And Section 5 argued that Haug’s supposedly novel variety of abstractness fails to
be importantly distinct from abstraction as cognitive transparency.
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